The £4 billion withdrawal
That seems to what following international law is worth to to the United Kingdom
I stopped yesterday because the United States launched airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Now, of course, we may have a cease-fire. Ferris Bueller, of course, was correct.
It turns out that the bombers did not come from Diego Garcia. The Air Force sent some westwards towards Guam as a ruse, in order to get the Iranians to think that they would continue on to Diego Garcia for a later attack. Apparently the Israelis were worried that the Iranians were starting to remove critical equipment from the targets. If Iran believed that an attack was imminent then they would speed up that process. Thus, the ruse.
But maybe the fact that no bombers came from Diego Garcia has something to do with the recent British decision?
Diego Garcia and the American raid
Some observers have suggested that Diego Garcia wasn’t used because the U.K. is under a legal obligation to inform Mauritius about any attacks in advance. I strongly doubt that is true. The agreement itself say only in Annex 1, Article 2: “The United Kingdom agrees to expeditiously inform Mauritius of any armed attack on a third State directly emanating from the Base on Diego Garcia.”
I haven’t found any evidence of British officials implying that “expeditiously” means “in advance.” Besides the fact that there really is no way to torture English into making “expeditiously” mean something completely different, Lord Coaker told Parliament the exact opposite quite explicitly:
We do not have to share information about actions taken from Diego Garcia in advance of us taking any action. I say that on the record because the noble Earl specifically asked me about it. We do not have to let Mauritius know in advance about it and then potentially share that information.
Much more likely is that the base wasn’t used because it would be hard to hide missions launched from there. The base is under so muxh surveillance from space that it’s easy to get public data on what’s based there. So the Iranians would know if the B-52s took off. Moreover, the only planes there were B-52s. Iranian air defenses may be surpressed but they’re not gone; the B-52 is more vulnerable than the B-2. And while the B-52 can carry the GBU-57 in theory, in practice they aren’t currently configured to carry it and B-52 pilots don’t train for using it. (There were B-2s based there in April but they’d been moved elsewhere by June.)
In short, the transfer of sovereignty had nothing to do with why Diego Garcia wasn’t used in the attack.
The strategic cost of giving back sovereignty?
Britain gains nothing from giving back sovereignty. But nor does it lose much strategic flexibility. The base is effectively under U.K. control — in practice, U.S. control—and no other powers are allowed to maintain security or military forces in the archipelago without U.K. approval.
The only real worry is that Mauritius might break the agreement. That could happen in two ways. First, Mauritius might just break the agreement and either tell the U.K. to leave or allow a third party to set up shop on the islands. The former is not a problem: possession is nine-tenths of the law. The latter could be a bigger problem, since the U.K. would have to decide to enforce the agreement against the third party. That would be a bigger political headache than simply defending U.K. sovereignty against encroachment.
Second, a third party might gain access to the islands by pretending to be Mauritian. There is precedent for that. The Soviet 64th Fighter Air Corps got away with pretending that it was the Korean People’s Air Force when the actual North Korean air force basically (according to Soviet sources) ceased functioning after August 22nd, 1950.1
Honestly, though, both worries seem speculative and a bit far-fetched. I understand why the U.S. is so relaxed about it. After all, we’re not paying anything, the British are.
The economic cost of giving back sovereignty!
So how much are the British spending to give the Chagos Islands back to Mauritius?
A lot. More than I ever would have expected!
Letter no. 1 published on page 33 of the Agreement lays out the schedule of payments that the U.K. is obligated to make. It’s a lot. The annual rent is £165 million until 2027. It then drops to £120 million until 2037, at which point the payment is linked to inflation as measured by the U.K.’s GDP deflator. The U.K. also immediately pays £40 million into a fund for the original displaced Chagossians and commits to £45 million annually in development aid between 2028 and 2052.
At current interest rates (4.6% for the U.K. 10-year government bond) and assuming that inflation averages 2% annually after 2038, the net present value of the deal comes to £4,223 million.
Is that a lot? £4.2 billion is a little more than the £3.8 billion cost of a Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carrier (the U.K. has two) or 2½ Astute-class nuclear attack submarines (the Royal Navy has five and plans to acquire seven) or about 50 F-35 fighter jets (the RAF currently plans to acquire 74, down from an original plan to field 138).
Given the U.K.’s defense needs, I would call it a lot, but mileage may vary.
I hope whatever diplomatic approbation or domestic satisfaction that the British government gets from these payments is worth it! Because in light of the past two posts, it’s hard to see why Britain should feel guilty about its record in Mauritius, and there don’t really seem to have been any tangible reasons to have made this agreement.
Ah, well, just another British mystery, I guess.
Douglas Dildy, “The Korean People’s Air Force in the Fatherland Liberation War: Part II,” Air Power History (Winter 2012), p. 11.